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Promotion by Oil Company of TBA Products Held 
Violative of FTC Section 5--Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC* 
713 
The Atlantic Refining Company entered into an agreement with 
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company which provided that 
Atlantic would receive a commission on all tires, batteries, and 
accessories (TBA) sold by Atlantic's wholesale and retail dealers. 
This commission was to be paid Atlantic in consideration for 
assistance given in promoting Goodyear products to the independ-
ent Atlantic service station operators.1 After an investigation of 
these agreements the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint 
against Goodyear and Atlantic charging them with violating section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 Evidence introduced at a 
hearing before a Federal Trade Commission trial examiner showed 
that Atlantic had coerced its dealers into purchasing Goodyear TBA 
by implying that renewal of their dealers' leases or equipment 
loans depended upon these purchases. The trial examiner found 
that through this coercion Atlantic implemented tacit tying arrange-
ments in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, and he formulated a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Atlantic's 
use of coercion on its dealers. The Federal Trade Commission 
affirmed the findings of the trial examiner but went further and 
defined the basic issue to be the legality of the sales commission 
agreements themselves: 
• 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 
1964) (No. 296). 
I. "Under the terms of the contract between Goodyear and Atlantic .•• , Atlantic 
is entitled to a commission amounting to 10 per cent of the net sales value of all 
sponsored (i.e., Goodyear •.. ) merchandise sold by Atlantic retail dealers, as considera-
tion for the assistance given by the Atlantic sales organization in obtaining TBA 
orders from Atlantic dealers." Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 335 (1961). 
The agreement between Atlantic and Goodyear covered only half of the Atlantic 
trading area. For the other half, Atlantic had a duplicate agreement with Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company. 
2. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). 
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"Atlantic has sufficient economic power with respect to its 
wholesale and retail petroleum distributors to cause them to 
purchase substantial quantities of sponsored TBA even without 
the use of overt coercive tactics or of written or oral tying 
agreements. . . . Determination of illegality in this context 
requires an evaluation of the competitive effects resulting from 
the sales commission method of distributing TBA . . . ."3 
Finding that the sales commission system effected a substantial 
foreclosure of markets on all levels of the TBA industry,4 the Com-
mission expanded the examiner's order by prohibiting Atlantic or 
Goodyear from further participation in sales commission agreements 
with any other TBA manufacturer or oil company.5 
This order was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.6 While the 
court of appeals admitted that "labeling is at times more harmful 
than helpful in formulating conceptions that correspond to reality,"7 
and further conceded that the contract between Goodyear and 
Atlantic had no tying features on its face, it found that the sales 
commission system was analogous to a tying arrangement8 and that 
it contained inherently unlawful features in light of the economic 
"servitude" imposed on the dealers by the oil companies.9 The 
court avoided any mechanical comparisons between the classical 
tie-in and the arrangement before it, but considered the effect of 
each on competition, reasoning that the sales commission scheme, 
like an explicitly stated tying arrangement, required the dealer to 
s:urrender his freedom to choose between competing brands of TBA. 
The Goodyear case is one of a series of actions filed by the FTC 
against the sales commission system, the favored device by which 
major oil companies and TBA manufacturers paid off in the dis-
tribution of TBA products.10 The practical result of the system 
3. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 364-65 (1961). (Emphasis added.) 
4. Id. at 369. 
5. Id. at 369-70. 
6. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ITC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 
33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). 
7. Id. at 400. 
8. Id. at 402. A tying arrangement has been defined by the Supreme Court as "an 
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer 
also purchases a different (or tied) product •••• " Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 
356 U.S. l, 5 (1958). Because such arrangements force the buyer to surrender his 
freedom of choice between competing products in the market for the tied product, 
they have fared poorly for many years under the antitrust laws. See United States v. 
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
9. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ITC, 331 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. 
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). As a tying arrangement the 
sales commission agreements were found to be illegal upon application of the doctrine of 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 8, which held that such restraints were 
unreasonable per se whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the 
tying product appreciably to restrain competition in the market for the tied product 
and a not insubstantial amount of commerce is affected. 
10. For a list of those oil companies with whom Goodyear has sales commission 
agreements, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 323 (1961). 
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has been that those independent dealers who "fly the flag" of a 
major oil company may handle only the TBA products that yield 
their oil company a commission. Prior to the adoption of the sales 
commission system the method most often used was the purchase-
resale plan, an arrangement that involved the purchase and ware-
housing of the TBA by the oil companies and a subsequent resale 
by them directly to their dealers.11 Until the Commission developed 
the approach used in the Goodyear case, neither of these two 
methods was considered illegal in itself. However, United States v. 
Sun Oil Co.12 held illegal oral or tacit tying arrangements found to 
accompany the purchase-resale plans when they were coercively 
exacted. The Court found that Sun's salesmen coerced its dealers 
by making pointed references to the oil company's 30-day cancella-
tion provision while suggesting that the dealers handle Sun's TBA 
to the exclusion of other brands. Sun was enjoined from "inducing, 
coercing and compelling" its dealers to enter into tacit agreements 
to deal exclusively in the TBA sold by Sun,13 although the con-
tinued use of the purchase-resale plan was not prohibited. In Osborn 
v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,14 sales commission agreements involving similar 
coercive tying arrangements were considered. The plaintiff in that 
case brought a private antitrust suit charging that his lease had been 
cancelled because he had not purchased substantial quantities of 
Goodyear TBA. The court found that Sinclair had engaged in an 
illegal course of conduct toward Osborn and its other dealers by 
conditioning their continued operation on the placing of substantial 
orders for Goodyear TBA.15 Thus, the courts have looked with dis-
favor on the oil companies' use of coercive power over their dealers 
to reap profits in another market. However, the courts went only 
so far as to enjoin or punish the use of overt coercive power by the 
oil companies. 
The novelty of Goodyear lies in the court's finding that, in light 
of the realities of power in the oil distribution industry, the oil 
companies can achieve the desired foreclosure of markets without 
following any demonstrably coercive course of conduct. The court 
viewed the relationship between the dealer and the oil company 
as an inherently coercive one in which the dealer was "more of an 
economic serf than a businessman" because of the great leverage 
provided the oil company by the lease and equipment loan contracts 
under which most of the dealers operate.16 It recognized that in such 
11. See Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1964), 
cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). 
12. 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). 
13. Id. at 739. 
14. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 96!! (1961). 
15. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 1960). 
16. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. 
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). 
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a context coercion can assume forms that would put its detection 
and control beyond the reach of the judicial process; therefore, it 
held the sales commission agreement, the oil companies' method of 
exploiting this power, was itself the evil to be eliminated.17 To 
build and equip a modern service station requires an initial invest-
ment beyond the resources of the ordinary service station operator.18 
The normal practice is for the dealer to lease his station, fully 
equipped, from the oil company. If the station is owned by some-
one other than the company, the dealer signs an equipment loan 
contract for the equipment necessary to operate the station. Both 
of these agreements are characteristically short-term arrangements, 
generally of one year, and the lease contains numerous cancellation 
provisions which make the term of occupancy, in actuality, a matter 
of the oil company's discretion.19 The immediate financial hardships 
of cancellation for the dealers are augmented by the understandable 
reluctance of other oil companies to take on a dealer who has been 
cancelled by another company. It is only natural for the dealer to be 
hesitant to arouse the displeasure of the oil company.20 "In that 
setting," the Goodyear court concluded, "recommendation is tanta-
mount to command . . . . Sophisticated methods of pressuring the 
dealers into carrying sponsored TBA are as effectual as express 
covenants and open threats.''21 
Prior to the Goodyear decision, when the sales commission agree-
ments were considered legal unless coercion was involved, courts 
generally were faced with the rather difficult problem of drawing a 
line between effective salesmanship and duress. By equating recom-
17. A significant amount of money is involved in these cases. The 1955 sales of 
TBA made by Goodyear through the Atlantic dealers came to $5,700,121, from which 
Atlantic realized $557,599. Firestone, whose sales commission agreement covered those 
Atlantic dealers not assigned to Goodyear, made sales in the same year to Atlantic 
dealers totalling $5,562,936 and paid Atlantic "overrides" of $506,199. When Atlantic's 
reward for pressuring its dealers comes to over one million dollars annually it naturally 
would be difficult to resist the temptation to do so. See Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 
58 F.T.C. 309, 315-16 (1961). 
18. The Commission found in a companion case to Goodyear that the cost of 
"constructing a modem service station, including land, averages about $90,000." 
Firestone Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 371, 403 (1961). 
19. These provisions, in Atlantic's case, were laid out in their "Eleven Point Lease 
Letter," which defined the standards of operation for Atlantic dealers. Though the 
standards themselves seem to reflect only the legitimate interest the oil company has 
in protecting its goodwill, they are couched in such vague terms as to make them 
possible shields for the use of purely discretionary cancellations. These provisions, 
policed by Atlantic through its regular sales force as well as "Phantom Customer 
Inspectors," gave ,the oil company the ability to cancel for breach at virtually any 
time it pleased. See Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 338-39 (1961). 
20. The trial examiner included as part of his findings that "dealers appearing to 
testify were under considerable pressure because they were naturally interested in not 
jeopardizing the renewal of their leases." Id. at 320. 
21. Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. 
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). 
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mendation with coercion, the court in the principal case achieved 
certainty and uniformity, but at the expense, it would seem, of a 
reasoned inquiry into the nature of the agreements and the cir-
cumstances surrounding them.22 The presumption that recommen-
dation equals coercion provided the illegal link between the sales 
commission agreements and the anti-competitive effects, thereby 
allowing the court to make use of the tying arrangement analogy 
in condemning the contracts as a section 5 violation. If the pre-
sumption is valid that the relationship between the dealer and the 
oil company is inherently coercive, the outlawing of the sales com-
mission agreements when they are found to be accompanied by 
anti-competitive effects would seem to be justified. But the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court has not been willing to give the Com-
mission the benefit of this presumption. In Texaco Inc. v. FTC,23 
on facts almost identical to those in the Goodyear case, it was held 
that the Commission had erred in concluding that Texaco had 
sufficient economic power over its dealers to force them to buy the 
promoted TBA. Although the dissent in Texaco suggested that the 
court's holding in favor of the oil company resulted primarily from 
the failure of the Commission to articulate facts and spell out its 
theories,24 it seems nevertheless clear that there is now a split in 
the circuits on the issue of inherent coercion.25 
Probably prompted by this split, the Supreme Court has agreed 
to pass on the matter,26 and there are indications that it may be more 
receptive to the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the dealer-oil 
company relationship than that of the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court. In the recent case of Simpson v. Union Oil Co.21 the Court 
struck down consignment agreements between the oil company and 
its dealers when they resulted in a program of resale price mainte-
nance and when fear of nonrenewal of short-term leases was used as 
a coercive policing device. In recognizing the effectiveness of the 
short-term lease as a policing device, the Court, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Dougl~, said that the lease provided the leverage by 
22. In charging a violation of § 5, the Commission is not restricted to proving any 
specific prohibitions of the Sherman or Clayton Acts. See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 
l!OO F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). The broad language of § 5 would seem to encourage utiliza-
tion by the Commission of an extended rule of reason when evaluating alleged illegal 
conduct. See Oppenheim, Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 M1cH. L. REV. 821 (1961). 
2ll. !136 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3165 
(U.S. Oct. 28, 1964) (No. 635). 
24. Id. at 766. 
25. "The mere fact that Texaco is a giant corporation and the dealers are in the 
main small businessmen cannot be said to demonstrate controlling economic power 
over the latter .••. " Id. at 762. 
26. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) 
(No. 296); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) 
(No. 292). 
27. !177 U.S. 13 (1964). 
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which the dealers were coercively tied into an arrangement which 
deprived them of the right to make independent business decisions.28 
Clearly viewing the dealer-oil company relationship as inherently 
coercive by reason of the short-term service station leases, the Court 
did not require that overt coercion be shown in order to prove that 
the dealers were being forced into an acceptance of the resale price 
maintenance program. All that was held to be necessary for a show-
ing of the existence of coercive policing of the consignment agree-
ments was evidence that the desired result was being achieved.29 
The Supreme Court's rather clear recognition of the inherently 
coercive nature of the dealer-oil company relationship, as well as 
its more basic concern with the welfare of the small "independent" 
businessmen who operate gasoline stations, may, however, cause the 
Court to oversimplify other factors in the sales commission system 
of TBA distribution. If the position of the Seventh Circuit is up-
held, the logical result would be the prohibition of any participation 
by the oil companies in the distribution of TBA to their dealers. 
For, should the oil companies return to the purchase-resale plan, 
the Commission, using the Goodyear tying arrangement theory, 
need merely find that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is 
affected to declare the plan illegal.30 However, even if the question-
able presumption of coercion is valid, there is a further relevant 
consideration. In its opening observation regarding the difficulty 
of formulating conceptions that correspond to actualities, the 
Goodyear court implies that its decision is firmly based upon the 
realities of the oil distribution industry, and specifically the actual 
position of the dealer vis-a-vis the oil company. "Ostensibly, they 
are independent businessmen; but behind the legalistic facade of 
independence, there exists a servitude caused by the coercive pres-
sures which Atlantic exerts upon its dealers."31 Underlying the 
Simpson and the Goodyear and Osborn decisions seems to be a sym-
pathetic attempt to liberate the gasoline service station operator 
from his dependence upon the oil company and allow him the 
position of a truly independent businessman. But as long as the 
28. "By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement dealers are coercively 
laced into an arrangement under which their supplier is able to impose noncompeti• 
tive prices on persons who otherwise might be competitive." Id. at 21. 
29. "If the 'consignment' agreement achieves resale price maintenance in violation 
of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce 
by depriving independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment of whether ••• to 
sell at competitive prices." Id. at 16. The similarity between this argument by Justice 
Douglas and the one formulated by the Commission in the Goodyear case is striking. 
The Commission in Goodyear held that if the sales commission agreement achieves a 
foreclosure of markets, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce 
by depriving the dealer of h~s freedom to choose between brands of TBA. 
30. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber .Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1964), 
cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). 
31. Id. at 400. 
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peculiarities of the gasoline distribution industry necessitate the 
close intermingling of the interests of the oil company with the 
interests of the dealers, the service station operator will never be a 
truly independent businessman. The power of the oil companies 
over their dealers must be sufficient to protect adequately the com-
pany's legitimate interest in the real estate and goodwill which it 
has entrusted to its lessees. By signing with a major oil company 
and thereby becoming a "member of the team," the dealer willingly 
gives up his status as a completely independent businessman in con-
sideration for innumerable benefits. 
The realities of the situation are not as simple as the court seems 
to picture them. In this light, the judiciary should be careful not to 
confuse restraints of trade, which constitute clear public injury, with 
mere restrictions on the freedom of the dealer to act as an independ-
ent businessman. This is where the approach of the Seventh Circuit 
would seem to differ significantly from the approach of the Com-
mission. The Commission accepted the fact that the oil companies 
enjoyed controlling economic power over their dealers but did not 
condemn its use as such; it condemned only the abuse of this power. 
Only when it resulted in anti-competitive effects did the Commission 
step in.32 By applying the tying arrangement analogy, the Seventh 
Circuit effectuated an important shift in emphasis from preventing 
anti-competitive effects toward protecting the dealers. Since one of 
the evils of the tying arrangement, as the Court has come to view it, 
is that it restricts the freedom of othenvise independent business-
men, as long as such a restriction affects a "not insubstantial" 
amount of commerce the courts will intervene to free the purchaser 
from these limitations. Because, however, of the necessarily "quasi-
independent" character of the service station operator, the realities 
of the situation should not support judicial intervention unless it 
can be clearly shown that such restrictions substantially injure the 
public or competitors. 
32. "Atlantic has sufficient economic power with respect to its wholesale and retail 
petroleum distributors to cause them to purchase substantial quantities of sponsored 
TBA • • • • Determination of illegality in this context requires an evaluation of the 
competitive eflects resulting from the sales commission method of distributing 
TBA. •••• " (Emphasis added.) Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 364-65 
(1961). 
